Author: drmani

Have you ever noticed how we all live inside stories?

“I’m just not a creative person.” “I always freeze up during presentations.” “I’ll never be successful like my brother.”

These aren’t just thoughts—they’re stories we tell about ourselves. Stories that shape how we see the world and our place in it. Stories that can either lift us up or hold us back.

But here’s the thing about stories: they can be rewritten. And hypnotherapy offers one of the most powerful ways to do just that.

Your Mind as a Self-Creating System

Think about your smartphone for a moment. When something goes wrong, you might need someone else to fix it or update its software. Your phone can’t repair itself—it needs outside help.

But your mind works differently. It’s what scientists call an “autopoietic” system—a fancy term that simply means “self-creating” or “self-producing.” Unlike your phone, your mind is constantly creating and maintaining itself through its own processes.

As Dr. Mani explains: “Your mind isn’t just passively receiving information from the world. It’s actively creating meaning, organizing experiences, and maintaining its own unique way of understanding reality.”

This is why simply telling yourself to “think positively” often doesn’t work. Your mind isn’t just a computer that needs new programming—it’s a living system with its own way of organizing reality.

Personal Meaning Organization: Your Mind’s Operating System

Psychologist Vittorio Guidano discovered that each of us has what he called a “Personal Meaning Organization” (PMO)—a unique way of making sense of our experiences.

Think of your PMO as your mind’s operating system. It’s the invisible set of rules that determines:

• What you pay attention to
• How you interpret events
• What you expect to happen
• How you feel about yourself and others

For example, someone with a “depressive organization” might automatically focus on loss and disappointment, while someone with a “phobic organization” might be hyper-alert to potential dangers.

Your PMO developed early in life, shaped by your relationships with caregivers and important early experiences. It’s not something you consciously chose—it’s more like the water a fish swims in, so familiar that you don’t even notice it’s there.

Where Hypnotherapy Comes In: Changing the System from Within

This is where hypnotherapy offers something truly special. Instead of just working with your conscious thoughts (the “user interface” of your mind), hypnotherapy accesses the deeper system itself.

“Traditional therapy often works at the explicit level—the thoughts and beliefs you can easily talk about,” says Dr. Mani. “Hypnotherapy allows us to work with the tacit level—the unconscious patterns that are actually driving the show.”

In the relaxed state of hypnosis, three powerful things happen:

1. Your Story Becomes Visible

First, hypnotherapy helps you become aware of your personal narrative—the story you’ve been living inside without realizing it.

Imagine you’ve been wearing tinted glasses your whole life without knowing it. Everything you see has a certain color, and you think that’s just how the world is. Hypnotherapy is like someone gently pointing out that you’re wearing glasses at all.

“Wait, you mean not everyone sees the world this way?”

That simple awareness creates the possibility for change.

2. Your System Becomes More Flexible

Second, hypnosis temporarily makes your autopoietic system more adaptable.

Remember, your mind naturally wants to maintain its current organization—even when that organization causes suffering. This is why change can be so difficult. Your mind resists anything that threatens its established way of making sense of the world.

Hypnosis creates what neuroscientists call “neural plasticity”—a state where your brain becomes more open to forming new connections and patterns. It’s like temporarily softening clay that has begun to harden so it can be reshaped.

3. New Stories Can Take Root Through Isomorphic Metaphors

This is where the magic of isomorphic metaphors comes in.

An isomorphic metaphor is a story or image that matches the structure of your problem—but changes the outcome. It speaks directly to your unconscious mind in a language it understands: symbols, images, and narratives.

The Power of Isomorphic Metaphors

Let me explain what makes these special metaphors so powerful:

Imagine someone who feels trapped in their career. They want to make a change but feel paralyzed by fear. Their mind has an established pattern: “Change equals danger; staying stuck equals safety.”

A direct approach might be to list all the logical reasons why change is good. But their unconscious mind isn’t convinced by logic—it operates on deeper patterns.

Instead, a hypnotherapist might tell a story about a butterfly:

“There was once a caterpillar who had lived its whole life crawling on branches. One day, it felt a strange urge to build a cocoon around itself. Part of the caterpillar was terrified—this felt like being buried alive! But another part knew this was necessary. Inside that dark cocoon, something amazing happened. The caterpillar didn’t just change a little—it transformed completely. When it emerged, it discovered it could now fly, experiencing a freedom and perspective it never imagined possible…”

This story is isomorphic (has the same structure) to the person’s situation:

• The caterpillar = the person now
• The cocoon = the uncomfortable transition period
• The butterfly = the transformed future self

The conscious mind might just hear a nice story, but the unconscious mind recognizes its own pattern and, crucially, sees a new possibility for how that pattern could unfold.

As Dr. Mani notes: “Isomorphic metaphors bypass conscious resistance because they don’t directly confront established beliefs. Instead, they offer new pathways that feel strangely familiar—like paths your mind always knew existed but had forgotten about.”

Rewriting Your Narrative Identity

Through this process, hypnotherapy helps you rewrite your narrative identity—the core story that defines who you are and what’s possible for you.

This isn’t about creating fake positive thinking. It’s about finding authentic new ways to organize your experience that better serve your growth and happiness.

A creative professional I worked with described it this way: “For years, I saw myself as a fraud just waiting to be exposed. After our hypnotherapy sessions, I realized I’d been living in a story that wasn’t even mine—it was pieced together from old criticisms and misunderstandings. Now I have a different story: I’m a creative explorer who brings value through my unique perspective. Same facts, completely different meaning.”

The Science Behind the Experience

Modern neuroscience helps explain why this approach works so well:

Two Levels of Knowledge

Your mind operates on two levels:

• Explicit knowledge: What you can easily explain and talk about
• Tacit knowledge: The unconscious patterns that actually guide most of your behavior

Traditional approaches focus mostly on explicit knowledge—the thoughts you’re aware of. But research shows that our tacit knowledge—the unconscious emotional patterns—actually drives most of our behavior and experience.

Hypnotherapy works directly with this tacit level, creating change where it matters most.

Enactive Cognition

Scientists studying “enactive cognition” have discovered that we don’t passively perceive reality—we actively create it through our interactions with the world.

Through hypnotherapy, you can change how you “enact” your world—altering the very way you perceive and engage with reality. It’s not just thinking differently; it’s experiencing differently.

Is This Approach Right for You?

This approach might be especially powerful for you if:

• You understand your problems intellectually but still feel stuck emotionally
• Traditional approaches haven’t created lasting change
• You’re tired of fighting against yourself and ready for a different approach
• You’ve noticed repeating patterns in your life despite your best efforts to change
• You sense there’s a deeper story driving your experiences

What Makes Our Approach Unique

As a physician and cognitive neuroscientist specializing in hypnotherapy, I bring a unique perspective to this work. Every technique is grounded in our understanding of how the brain creates meaning and how narratives shape our experience.

This isn’t about quick fixes or simplistic positive thinking. It’s about working with the natural processes of your mind to create authentic, lasting transformation.

A New Story Waiting to Be Written

The stories we tell ourselves shape everything—how we feel, what we believe is possible, and the actions we take. When those stories no longer serve us, we don’t need to remain trapped within them.

Through the unique doorway that hypnotherapy provides, you can access and revise the very operating system of your mind. You can create a narrative identity that authentically reflects who you are and supports the life you want to create.

Your new story is waiting to be written. And unlike the old one, this one gets to be consciously chosen—by you.

Ready to Rewrite Your Story? Let’s Talk

If you’re curious about how this approach might work for your specific situation, I invite you to schedule a free 45-minute clarity consultation.

During this conversation, we’ll:

• Identify the narrative patterns that might be holding you back
• Explore how hypnotherapy could help with your specific goals
• Answer any questions you have about the process
• Determine if we’re a good fit to work together

There’s no pressure or obligation—just a chance to see if this path might be right for you.

Schedule your free consultation today:

• Visit: yourwebsite.com/schedule
• Call: (980) 485-6988
• Email: drmani@mosaeichypnosis.com

Your transformation begins with a single conversation. Why not have that conversation today?

The term subpersonal priors refers to prior beliefs or expectations encoded at the level of the brain’s unconscious, automatic processes, rather than at the level of conscious, personal awareness. These priors operate within the brain’s generative model, which underpins active inference by predicting and interpreting sensory inputs to guide behavior.

In the context of active inference, subpersonal denotes cognitive processes that occur below the level of conscious thought and are attributed to neural or computational mechanisms rather than to the person as a whole. For example, while a person may consciously decide to act in a certain way (a personal-level decision), their brain’s subpersonal systems are constantly generating predictions and updating beliefs based on sensory data without conscious input36.

By absorbing incentive values into these subpersonal priors, active inference avoids explicitly representing rewards or goals as separate entities. Instead, preferred outcomes are implicitly encoded within these priors as having higher probabilities, shaping action selection automatically based on what is most likely to minimize uncertainty or achieve desired states1

In the intricate dance between perception and reality, our brains continuously engage in a process of hypothesis testing—weighing sensory input against prior expectations to construct our conscious experience. When this delicate balance shifts too far toward prior beliefs operating at unconscious levels, hallucinations can emerge. This report examines how subpersonal priors—automatic expectation mechanisms operating below conscious awareness—can generate perceptual experiences detached from objective reality.

The Predictive Coding Framework and Strong Priors

The predictive coding theory of perception proposes that the brain actively generates predictions about sensory inputs rather than passively receiving information. Within this framework, hallucinations can be understood as false positive inferences that occur when prior beliefs exert excessive influence over perceptual processes. Recent empirical research demonstrates that strong, overly precise priors can produce hallucinations even in healthy individuals, with hallucination-prone people showing increased susceptibility to these laboratory-induced phenomena15.

The balance between prior beliefs and sensory evidence forms a critical fulcrum for perceptual stability. When this equilibrium tilts excessively toward priors—particularly at the subpersonal, automatic level of neural processing—perception becomes dominated by expectations rather than actual sensory input. This imbalance can manifest as perceiving something that isn’t physically present, which defines a hallucination78.

Empirical Evidence for Prior Overweighting

Multiple independent laboratories have documented the relationship between prior overweighting and hallucination susceptibility. Controlled studies have shown that hallucination-prone individuals exhibit stronger employment of both global (gist) and local (detail) priors during perceptual tasks3. This suggests these individuals rely more heavily on their pre-existing beliefs or expectations when interpreting ambiguous sensory information.

In one particularly illuminating experimental paradigm called the “Conditioned Hallucinations” task, researchers found that participants who experience hallucinations in daily life were more likely to report hearing sounds that weren’t presented during the experiment10. These findings were consistent across both clinical and non-clinical populations, indicating that the overweighting of perceptual priors relative to sensory evidence represents a transdiagnostic mechanism underlying hallucinatory experiences7.

Active Inference and the Generation of False Percepts

The active inference model provides a computational framework for understanding how subpersonal priors influence perception and potentially lead to hallucinations. In this model, perception operates as a process of hypothesis testing, where sensory data help disambiguate between alternative explanations about the world2. Crucially, this inferential process depends on maintaining an appropriate balance between prior beliefs about hidden variables and the sensations they cause.

When applied to auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH), this model suggests that a false inference that a voice is present, despite the absence of corresponding auditory input, indicates the domination of prior beliefs over perceptual inference7. Computer simulations based on this framework demonstrate that hallucinatory percepts can emerge when an agent expects to hear a voice in the presence of imprecise sensory data2.

The Precision Weighting Mechanism

A key mechanism in the relationship between subpersonal priors and hallucinations involves precision weighting—the brain’s assignment of confidence levels to both predictions and prediction errors. Precision can be conceptualized as the inverse of uncertainty; highly precise signals are weighted more heavily in perceptual inference12.

Hallucinations may result from either overly precise prior beliefs or reduced precision of sensory evidence that contradicts expectations. As one study explains, “a down-weighting of the precision of sensations (i.e., silence) that contradict the expected percept (i.e., a voice)” can lead to false perceptions7. This precision imbalance causes the brain to favor its predictions over contradictory sensory information, potentially resulting in the perception of stimuli that aren’t objectively present.

Different Types of Hallucinations Based on Belief Structures

Research distinguishes between different types of hallucinations based on the nature of the underlying belief disturbances. “In-context hallucinations” occur when individuals cannot use sensory information to correct prior beliefs about hearing a voice, but their beliefs about content (such as the sequential order of a sentence) remain accurate8. In contrast, “out-of-context hallucinations” emerge when hallucinating subjects also have inaccurate beliefs about state transitions, leading to disordered hallucinated content reminiscent of the bizarre hallucinations sometimes observed in conditions like schizophrenia8.

This distinction helps explain the spectrum of hallucinatory experiences—from those that seem plausible given the context to more bizarre manifestations disconnected from environmental contingencies. The computational mechanisms underlying these different manifestations involve varying degrees of precision imbalance at different levels of the perceptual hierarchy38.

Clinical Implications and State-Sensitivity

Understanding hallucinations through the lens of subpersonal priors carries significant clinical implications. Research has shown that the relationship between prior overweighting and hallucination propensity is not merely a static trait but rather a state-sensitive marker that can fluctuate with symptom severity10. This dynamic relationship suggests that measuring changes in perceptual prior weighting could potentially serve as a biomarker for tracking hallucination susceptibility or treatment response.

Interestingly, studies have found that patients with psychosis who do not experience hallucinations do not show the same pattern of prior overweighting4, indicating specificity of this abnormality to hallucinations rather than psychotic illness more broadly. This specificity further supports the centrality of subpersonal prior mechanisms in hallucination formation.

Conclusion

The relationship between subpersonal priors and hallucinations represents a compelling example of how automatic brain processes operating below conscious awareness can profoundly influence our perceptual experience. When these priors become too strong or precise relative to sensory evidence, they can generate percepts detached from physical reality—hallucinations.

This predictive coding account of hallucinations offers a unifying framework that spans from normal perception to pathological states, emphasizing the continuum of perceptual experiences rather than categorical distinctions. It encourages a more empathic approach to clinical hallucinations by recognizing them as extreme manifestations of normal perceptual mechanisms rather than entirely alien phenomena5.

As research in this area continues to advance, improved understanding of the computational and neural mechanisms underlying hallucinations may lead to novel interventions targeting the precision balance between prior beliefs and sensory evidence, potentially offering new avenues for treating distressing hallucinations across various clinical conditions.

The perception of reality absent physical stimuli—hallucinations—exemplifies how our brains construct rather than merely capture the world around us. Recent computational neuroscience approaches have illuminated the mechanisms behind these false percepts, particularly through predictive coding and Bayesian inference frameworks. These models suggest hallucinations emerge when the delicate balance between our brain’s expectations and actual sensory input becomes disrupted. This report examines how various computational mechanisms contribute to false inferences that manifest as hallucinatory experiences, with evidence supporting both perceptual dysfunction and belief-processing aberrations.

Predictive Coding and the Precision Imbalance

The predictive coding theory proposes that perception operates as an active process of hypothesis testing rather than passive sensory reception. In this framework, the brain continually generates predictions about incoming sensory data and updates these predictions based on prediction errors—the mismatch between expectations and actual sensory input. Hallucinations emerge when this delicate balance shifts too heavily toward prior expectations at the expense of sensory evidence.

Multiple empirical studies demonstrate that hallucination-prone individuals exhibit stronger reliance on perceptual priors during ambiguous sensory tasks. These individuals show increased susceptibility to laboratory-induced hallucinations, suggesting that overweighting of prior beliefs relative to sensory evidence represents a transdiagnostic mechanism underlying hallucinatory experiences. One particularly illuminating experimental paradigm called the “Conditioned Hallucinations” task revealed that participants who experience hallucinations in daily life were more likely to report hearing sounds that weren’t actually presented during the experiment34. These findings remained consistent across both clinical and non-clinical populations.

At the heart of this imbalance lies a key computational mechanism called precision weighting—the brain’s assignment of confidence levels to both predictions and prediction errors. Precision can be conceptualized as the inverse of uncertainty; highly precise signals are weighted more heavily in perceptual inference. Hallucinations may result from either overly precise prior beliefs or reduced precision of sensory evidence that contradicts expectations35.

Sensory Precision Deficits

Recent research provides compelling evidence for the role of reduced sensory precision in hallucination formation. Participants with recent hallucinatory experiences as well as those with higher hallucination-proneness demonstrated higher stimulus thresholds, lower sensitivity to stimuli presented at the highest threshold, and lower response confidence—all consistent with reduced precision of sensory evidence410. This finding suggests that both reduced sensory precision and increased prior weighting are independently related to hallucination severity.

As one study explains, “a down-weighting of the precision of sensations (i.e., silence) that contradict the expected percept (i.e., a voice)” can lead to false perceptions5. This precision imbalance causes the brain to favor its predictions over contradictory sensory information, potentially resulting in the perception of stimuli that aren’t objectively present. Importantly, this mechanism helps explain why hallucinations often occur in noisy or ambiguous environments where sensory signals are inherently less precise.

Active Inference and Generation of False Percepts

The active inference model provides a more comprehensive computational framework for understanding hallucinations by incorporating the role of action selection in perception. Under active inference, agents not only form predictions about sensory input but also actively sample their environment to gather evidence for their beliefs about the world5. This perspective treats perception and action as inseparable aspects of the same process—minimizing surprise by making the world conform to expectations.

Computer simulations based on this framework demonstrate that hallucinatory percepts can emerge when an agent expects to hear a voice in the presence of imprecise sensory data5. When applied to auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH), this model suggests that a false inference that a voice is present, despite the absence of corresponding auditory input, indicates the domination of prior beliefs over perceptual inference5.

The active inference account particularly addresses the interactive nature of many hallucinations. For example, people who experience auditory hallucinations often engage in dialog with their voices. This interactive quality emerges naturally from the active inference framework, as the agent’s actions (such as listening or speaking) influence their perceptual inferences about hidden states of the environment5. Crucially, these actions are driven by the same predictive process that generates perceptions.

Through mathematical modeling using Markov decision processes, researchers have formally expressed how hallucinations arise from the interaction between action and perception. In this formulation, the content of and confidence in prior beliefs depends on beliefs about policies (sequences of actions like listening and talking) and on beliefs about the reliability of sensory data5.

Different Types of Hallucinations Based on Belief Structures

Computational models have helped differentiate between distinct types of hallucinatory experiences based on the nature of the underlying belief disturbances. “In-context hallucinations” occur when individuals cannot use sensory information to correct prior beliefs about hearing a voice, but their beliefs about content (such as the sequential order of a sentence) remain accurate1112. In contrast, “out-of-context hallucinations” emerge when hallucinating subjects also have inaccurate beliefs about state transitions, leading to disordered hallucinated content reminiscent of the bizarre hallucinations sometimes observed in conditions like schizophrenia1112.

This distinction helps explain the spectrum of hallucinatory experiences—from those that seem plausible given the context to more bizarre manifestations disconnected from environmental contingencies. For example, a person experiencing in-context hallucinations might hear a voice saying contextually appropriate phrases, while someone with out-of-context hallucinations might perceive jumbled or semantically incoherent speech.

The computational mechanisms underlying these different manifestations involve varying degrees of precision imbalance at different levels of the perceptual hierarchy. Simulations show that subjects with inaccurate beliefs about state transitions but an intact ability to use sensory information do not hallucinate and resemble prodromal patients—individuals who experience attenuated psychotic symptoms before developing full psychosis1112. This suggests that the progression from prodromal states to frank psychosis may involve a gradual shift in the balance between sensory precision and prior beliefs.

Reconciling Contradictory Findings: The Hierarchical Processing Solution

A significant challenge in the computational understanding of hallucinations is the apparent contradiction in research findings: some studies implicate weakened prior beliefs in psychosis, while others find stronger priors in hallucinations389. This apparent disconnect becomes comprehensible when considering the hierarchical nature of perceptual processing.

Rather than having uniformly strong or weak priors throughout the perceptual system, individuals may have different precision imbalances at different levels of the perceptual hierarchy and across different sensory modalities39. For example, in the hierarchical processing of speech, weak priors at a lower level might fail to constrain sensory noise, while strong priors at a higher level might generate false perceptions based on expected patterns38.

When illusions are not perceived by patients with schizophrenia, it could be that they fail to attenuate sensory precision, enabling prediction errors to ascend the hierarchy to induce belief updating8. These un-attenuated prediction errors may induce a particular sort of high-level prior belief that becomes the hallucination8. Indeed, research suggests that psychotic individuals with hallucinations utilize different priors than those without hallucinations, even within the same task8. People with hallucinations have strong perceptual priors that are not present in psychotic patients who do not hallucinate, who instead may have weak priors8.

The dynamic interaction between lower-level sensory processing and higher-level beliefs creates a complex landscape in which hallucinations can emerge through multiple computational pathways. This perspective helps reconcile seemingly contradictory findings and underscores the importance of considering the full hierarchical context of perceptual inference.

Neurobiological Underpinnings of Computational Aberrations

The computational mechanisms described above have plausible neurobiological correlates. The main neurotransmitter alterations thought to underlie predictive coding abnormalities include hypofunction of cortical NMDA receptors, dysfunction of gamma-aminobutyric acidergic neurons, and elevated striatal dopamine D2 receptor activity3. These neurochemical changes affect the precision-weighting mechanisms that balance prior beliefs against sensory evidence.

Researchers theorize that maladaptive priors may be encoded in upper levels of the processing hierarchy with weighting modified by dopaminergic signaling, whereas lower-quality sensory evidence could result from reduced integrity of white matter connections such as the arcuate fasciculus or alterations in cholinergic tone4. These neurotransmitter systems provide biological mechanisms through which computational parameters like precision can be regulated in the brain.

In schizophrenia specifically, these computational alterations may relate to loss of synaptic gain control in superficial pyramidal cells, changes in the excitatory-inhibitory balance in sensory cortex, cortical gray matter loss, and disrupted corticothalamic connectivity3. These neurobiological changes align with the computational account of hallucinations as arising from precision imbalances in predictive processing.

Clinical Implications and Future Directions

Understanding hallucinations through the lens of computational mechanisms carries significant clinical implications. Research shows that the relationship between prior overweighting and hallucination propensity is not merely a static trait but rather a state-sensitive marker that fluctuates with symptom severity3. This dynamic relationship suggests that measuring changes in perceptual prior weighting could potentially serve as a biomarker for tracking hallucination susceptibility or treatment response.

Notably, patients with psychosis who do not experience hallucinations do not show the same pattern of prior overweighting, indicating specificity of this abnormality to hallucinations rather than psychotic illness more broadly3. This specificity further supports the centrality of subpersonal prior mechanisms in hallucination formation and suggests targeted interventions might be developed to address this specific computational deficit.

The predictive coding account of hallucinations offers a unifying framework that spans from normal perception to pathological states, emphasizing the continuum of perceptual experiences rather than categorical distinctions38. This perspective encourages a more empathic approach to clinical hallucinations by recognizing them as extreme manifestations of normal perceptual mechanisms rather than entirely alien phenomena.

Conclusion

The computational mechanisms leading to false inferences in hallucinations represent a compelling demonstration of how automatic brain processes operating below conscious awareness profoundly influence perceptual experience. When subpersonal priors become too strong or precise relative to sensory evidence, they can generate percepts detached from physical reality—hallucinations.

Several key computational mechanisms contribute to these false inferences: overly precise prior beliefs relative to sensory evidence; down-weighting of the precision of contradictory sensory information; aberrant encoding of precision due to neurobiological alterations; hierarchical imbalances between lower and higher-level processing; and distinct mechanisms for in-context versus out-of-context hallucinations.

As research in this area advances, improved understanding of these computational mechanisms may lead to novel interventions targeting the precision balance between prior beliefs and sensory evidence. By recognizing hallucinations as arising from fundamental perceptual inference processes rather than categorically distinct phenomena, we gain not only scientific insight but also a more nuanced and compassionate perspective on the hallucinatory experience—potentially opening new avenues for treating distressing hallucinations across various clinical conditions.

Subpersonal priors—the unconscious expectations operating below conscious awareness that shape perception and cognition—can indeed be trained and modified, though with important qualifications and constraints. These implicit probabilistic beliefs form a crucial component of how our brains process information, guiding everything from basic sensory processing to complex social cognition. Understanding their malleability has significant implications for learning, habit formation, and clinical interventions.

Hierarchical Organization and Differential Plasticity

Subpersonal priors exist within a hierarchical structure, and their susceptibility to modification varies significantly depending on their position within this hierarchy. According to predictive processing frameworks, priors operate at multiple levels of cognitive processing, with differential capacities for updating and change.

At intermediate levels of processing, subpersonal priors function as “empirical priors” that are regularly updated through incoming sensory evidence. These priors demonstrate significant plasticity, as “they are updated by evidence from lower levels” and depend upon experience1. This aligns with the fundamental predictive processing principle that “today’s posteriors become tomorrow’s priors,” indicating an ongoing process of adjustment and refinement1.

However, not all subpersonal priors share this flexibility. Particularly at lower levels of processing, certain priors are held with greater precision and demonstrate remarkable resistance to updating. For example, “innate subpersonal priors that underwrite homeostasis” are “clearly less amenable to updating”1. These deeply embedded priors serve fundamental biological functions and thus resist modification even in the face of contradictory evidence.

Precision Weighting and Updating Mechanisms

A key mechanism governing the plasticity of subpersonal priors involves precision weighting—the brain’s assignment of confidence levels to both predictions and sensory evidence. The philosophical literature supports that “on the PP approach, subpersonal priors are also rationally adjustable in light of contrary (sensory) evidence”6. This suggests that even without conscious intervention, subpersonal systems can adjust their expectations based on prediction errors.

The precision assigned to these priors directly influences their resistance to change. When precision is high, the prior exerts greater influence and resists updating; when precision is low, the prior becomes more amenable to modification through incoming evidence. This precision weighting mechanism explains why some subpersonal priors remain stubbornly resistant to change while others demonstrate remarkable plasticity.

Pathways for Training and Modification

Several specific mechanisms facilitate the training and modification of subpersonal priors:

Experience-Dependent Neural Plasticity

Experience-dependent neural plasticity represents a fundamental mechanism through which subpersonal priors can be modified. Research on brain reorganization following damage illustrates how experiences can shape neural architecture. Training produces measurable “neuroanatomical plasticity” including increased synaptic densities and the proliferation of specific synapse subtypes7. These structural changes likely provide the physiological substrate for modified priors.

This experience-driven plasticity interacts with reactive neural plasticity to create growth-permissive environments in the brain that are more sensitive to behavioral experiences7. This enhanced sensitivity facilitates the learning of new behavioral patterns, which subsequently reinforces and further shapes the underlying neural architecture and associated priors.

Cultural Transmission and Supra-Personal Control

Higher-level subpersonal priors show particular susceptibility to modification through social and cultural processes. As noted in the research, “our prior expectations at this level of control are malleable and largely determined by our culture”5. This suggests that cultural learning represents a powerful mechanism for shaping and modifying many subpersonal priors.

The concept of “supra-personal control” illuminates how messages from others can alter private cognitive processes5. This cultural transmission involves two critical processes: converting private cognitive representations into public forms that can be communicated, and the reverse process through which public information modifies private processes. These interactions “at the top of the hierarchy of control create and maintain cultural priors”5.

Interestingly, while high-level priors may resist modification through bottom-up evidence, they “can be very quickly changed by top-down messages from other people”5. This asymmetric response to modification attempts reflects an adaptive strategy: “We can get more precise priors from other people who have had more experience. We can get even better estimates from our cultural milieu because this encompasses the experience of many people over a long time”5.

Automatization of Conscious Processes

Another pathway for modifying subpersonal priors involves the automatization of initially conscious processes. With practice, “cognitive processes cease to be controlled and become automatic”5. This transition from controlled to automatic processing is accompanied by “a reduction of activity in frontal cortex presumably because monitoring and control is no longer needed”5.

This mechanism explains how intentional practice can eventually reshape subpersonal priors, as deliberate behaviors become habitual and the corresponding neural patterns become encoded at a subpersonal level. For example, in the context of ethical behavior, “selfish behavior has ceased to be the default behavior and altruistic behavior has become habitual”5 through repetition and practice.

Resistance and Constraints to Modification

Despite their potential for change, subpersonal priors demonstrate notable resistance to modification under specific conditions:

Motivated Resistance to Updating

Priors that align with an agent’s motivations or desires demonstrate particular resistance to updating. As noted in research on stereotype formation, “higher order priors can be less amendable to update if the existing higher order predictions are positive for the agent and the incoming evidence is negative for the agent”1. This suggests that subpersonal priors that serve beneficial functions for the individual may resist modification even in the face of contradictory evidence.

The research notes that “only when encountering information highly contradictory to group-based priors do perceptually implemented stereotypes/prejudices become amendable to update”1. This indicates that the threshold for evidence required to modify deeply held priors can be extraordinarily high, particularly when those priors serve psychological or social functions.

Level-Specific Constraints

Different levels of subpersonal priors demonstrate different constraints on modification. While “higher level priors can be quickly changed by top-down messages,” lower-level perceptual priors often demonstrate remarkable stubbornness. Some visual priors, for example, are “remarkably stubborn and difficult to override, suggesting they’re deeply encoded in the architecture of the visual system”1. This architectural constraint reveals how certain subpersonal priors can operate independently of personal-level cognition and resist modification.

Conclusion

The evidence clearly indicates that subpersonal priors can indeed be trained and modified, though with important qualifications regarding their hierarchical level, precision, and functional role. Higher-level priors demonstrate greater susceptibility to modification through cultural learning and social interaction, while lower-level priors often show remarkable resistance to change, particularly those involved in fundamental biological functions.

This understanding of subpersonal prior modification has significant implications across domains from education to clinical interventions. The multiple pathways for modifying priors—through experience-dependent plasticity, cultural transmission, and the automatization of conscious processes—offer potential avenues for intentional intervention and modification of maladaptive priors. However, the stubborn resistance of certain priors, particularly those aligned with an agent’s motivations or serving fundamental functions, presents a significant challenge that requires targeted, persistent approaches to overcome.

These insights not only illuminate the complex nature of cognitive change but also suggest practical approaches for facilitating learning, habit formation, and behavioral change through the strategic modification of underlying subpersonal priors.